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Evaluación de seguridad versionada
ID del informe: SA-0519034D
7/9/2026, 11:46:49 AM
appflowy-api evaluación de seguridad v5
Informe de certificación de seguridad de la habilidad
Modelo de auditoría: codex Informe histórico
- Nombre de la habilidad
- appflowy-api
- Versión
- v5
- Mantenedor
- BaloneGit
- Cobertura
- 40 Archivos escaneados · 3,944 Líneas analizadas
- Versión de la política
- No disponible
Gravedad máxima de hallazgo confirmada
Alto
16 hallazgos de seguridad confirmados requieren atención.
Contexto de instalación
Evidencia histórica
Este informe podría no describir el artefacto instalable actualmente. Abra la página actual de la Skill para obtener orientación de instalación.
Abrir la página actual de la habilidadEste informe no bloquea ni autoriza el manifiesto ni el ZIP.
The skill is not malicious and no prompt injection attempt was found, but it deliberately performs authenticated AppFlowy network operations and handles credentials. Most static reconnaissance, certificate-key, shell-backtick, filesystem, and obfuscation findings are false positives from documentation, identifiers, stdin reads, or fixed helper invocations. The main risks are plain HTTP/private endpoint examples, command-line credential exposure, opt-in .env parsing, token output, and destructive collab updates.
Posición del informe
Informe histórico
Abra el historial de auditorías antes de usar este informe para instalar.
Atestación de auditoría
No se puede certificar
La vinculación inmutable requerida está incompleta.
Verificación humana
No verificado
No se ha registrado ninguna verificación humana para este informe.
Cobertura
40 Archivos escaneados · 3,944 Líneas analizadas
35 elementos mostrados para revisión
Limitaciones
Este informe no afirma ninguna ejecución en tiempo de ejecución ni en entorno aislado y no prueba la ausencia de efectos secundarios.
Cadena de evidencias
Sigue la evidencia desde la vinculación del código fuente hasta el contrato de instalación. La evidencia disponible permite la verificación; no constituye una garantía de seguridad.
Fuente
Vinculación no disponible
Artefacto
Identidad incompleta
Auditoría
Completo
Capacidades observadas
Observado significa que este informe registró evidencia de respaldo. No registrado no prueba que una capacidad esté ausente.
Contiene scripts
Puede ejecutar código incluido con la habilidad.
No registrado por esta auditoría
Acceso a red
Puede conectarse a servicios externos.
Observado en 8 ubicaciones de evidencia
Acceso al sistema de archivos
Puede leer o escribir archivos locales.
Observado en 3 ubicaciones de evidencia
Variables de entorno
Puede leer valores del entorno del proceso.
Observado en 11 ubicaciones de evidencia
Comandos externos
Puede invocar comandos o programas fuera de la habilidad.
Observado en 41 ubicaciones de evidencia
Elementos de revisión de capacidades (19)
Medio
Hardcoded URL
"base_url": "http://10.60.0.189",
The finding points to a concrete private HTTP AppFlowy or GoTrue endpoint in executable examples or config. Users could send credentials or tokens to an unintended host if copied unchanged.
Medio
Hardcoded URL
"gotrue_url": "http://10.60.0.189/gotrue",
The finding points to a concrete private HTTP AppFlowy or GoTrue endpoint in executable examples or config. Users could send credentials or tokens to an unintended host if copied unchanged.
Medio
Hardcoded IP address
"base_url": "http://10.60.0.189",
The finding points to a concrete private HTTP AppFlowy or GoTrue endpoint in executable examples or config. Users could send credentials or tokens to an unintended host if copied unchanged.
Medio
Hardcoded IP address
"gotrue_url": "http://10.60.0.189/gotrue",
The finding points to a concrete private HTTP AppFlowy or GoTrue endpoint in executable examples or config. Users could send credentials or tokens to an unintended host if copied unchanged.
Medio
Python HTTP libraries
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
The client imports urllib and later performs authenticated AppFlowy and GoTrue requests. This is expected functionality but it handles bearer tokens and workspace data over the network.
Medio
Hardcoded URL
curl -sS -X POST "http://10.60.0.189/gotrue/token?grant_type=password" \
The finding points to a concrete private HTTP AppFlowy or GoTrue endpoint in executable examples or config. Users could send credentials or tokens to an unintended host if copied unchanged.
Medio
Hardcoded URL
curl -sS "http://10.60.0.189/api/search/<workspace_id>?query=test" \
The finding points to a concrete private HTTP AppFlowy or GoTrue endpoint in executable examples or config. Users could send credentials or tokens to an unintended host if copied unchanged.
Medio
Hardcoded IP address
curl -sS -X POST "http://10.60.0.189/gotrue/token?grant_type=password" \
The finding points to a concrete private HTTP AppFlowy or GoTrue endpoint in executable examples or config. Users could send credentials or tokens to an unintended host if copied unchanged.
Medio
Hardcoded IP address
curl -sS "http://10.60.0.189/api/search/<workspace_id>?query=test" \
The finding points to a concrete private HTTP AppFlowy or GoTrue endpoint in executable examples or config. Users could send credentials or tokens to an unintended host if copied unchanged.
Bajo
Python environment access
os.environ.get("APPFLOWY_BASE_URL"),
The code reads narrowly scoped AppFlowy environment variables for endpoints, client version, or device ID. This is legitimate configuration access, but it can steer authenticated network requests.
Bajo
Python environment access
os.environ.get("API_EXTERNAL_URL"),
The code reads narrowly scoped AppFlowy environment variables for endpoints, client version, or device ID. This is legitimate configuration access, but it can steer authenticated network requests.
Bajo
Python environment access
os.environ.get("APPFLOWY_GOTRUE_BASE_URL"),
The code reads narrowly scoped AppFlowy environment variables for endpoints, client version, or device ID. This is legitimate configuration access, but it can steer authenticated network requests.
Bajo
Python environment access
os.environ.get("APPFLOWY_CLIENT_VERSION"),
The code reads narrowly scoped AppFlowy environment variables for endpoints, client version, or device ID. This is legitimate configuration access, but it can steer authenticated network requests.
Bajo
Python environment access
os.environ.get("APPFLOWY_DEVICE_ID"),
The code reads narrowly scoped AppFlowy environment variables for endpoints, client version, or device ID. This is legitimate configuration access, but it can steer authenticated network requests.
Bajo
Python environment access
resolved_base = (base_url or os.environ.get("APPFLOWY_BASE_URL") or env.get("APPFLOWY_BASE_URL"))
The code reads narrowly scoped AppFlowy environment variables for endpoints, client version, or device ID. This is legitimate configuration access, but it can steer authenticated network requests.
Bajo
Python environment access
or os.environ.get("API_EXTERNAL_URL")
The code reads narrowly scoped AppFlowy environment variables for endpoints, client version, or device ID. This is legitimate configuration access, but it can steer authenticated network requests.
Bajo
Python environment access
or os.environ.get("APPFLOWY_GOTRUE_BASE_URL")
The code reads narrowly scoped AppFlowy environment variables for endpoints, client version, or device ID. This is legitimate configuration access, but it can steer authenticated network requests.
Bajo
Python environment access
or os.environ.get("APPFLOWY_CLIENT_VERSION")
The code reads narrowly scoped AppFlowy environment variables for endpoints, client version, or device ID. This is legitimate configuration access, but it can steer authenticated network requests.
Bajo
Python environment access
or os.environ.get("APPFLOWY_DEVICE_ID")
The code reads narrowly scoped AppFlowy environment variables for endpoints, client version, or device ID. This is legitimate configuration access, but it can steer authenticated network requests.
Hallazgos de riesgos
Las preocupaciones de seguridad confirmadas están separadas de los elementos que aún deben revisarse.
Preocupaciones de seguridad confirmadas (16)
RISK-001 Alto
Environment file access
parser.add_argument("--env", default=None, help="Path to .env file (optional, opt-in).")
The script exposes an opt-in --env path that is passed into shared client setup, which parses key-value data from a .env file. This is legitimate but sensitive because .env files often contain secrets.
RISK-002 Alto
Environment file access
parser.add_argument("--env", default=None, help="Path to .env file (optional, opt-in).")
The script exposes an opt-in --env path that is passed into shared client setup, which parses key-value data from a .env file. This is legitimate but sensitive because .env files often contain secrets.
RISK-003 Alto
Environment file access
raise AppFlowyError(f".env file not found: {env_path}")
The script exposes an opt-in --env path that is passed into shared client setup, which parses key-value data from a .env file. This is legitimate but sensitive because .env files often contain secrets.
RISK-004 Alto
Environment file access
parser.add_argument("--env", default=None, help="Path to .env file (optional, opt-in).")
The script exposes an opt-in --env path that is passed into shared client setup, which parses key-value data from a .env file. This is legitimate but sensitive because .env files often contain secrets.
RISK-005 Alto
Environment file access
parser.add_argument("--env", default=None, help="Path to .env file (optional, opt-in).")
The script exposes an opt-in --env path that is passed into shared client setup, which parses key-value data from a .env file. This is legitimate but sensitive because .env files often contain secrets.
RISK-006 Alto
Environment file access
parser.add_argument("--env", default=None, help="Path to .env file (optional, opt-in).")
The script exposes an opt-in --env path that is passed into shared client setup, which parses key-value data from a .env file. This is legitimate but sensitive because .env files often contain secrets.
RISK-007 Alto
Environment file access
parser.add_argument("--env", default=None, help="Path to .env file (optional, opt-in).")
The script exposes an opt-in --env path that is passed into shared client setup, which parses key-value data from a .env file. This is legitimate but sensitive because .env files often contain secrets.
RISK-008 Alto
Environment file access
parser.add_argument("--env", default=None, help="Path to .env file (optional, opt-in).")
The script exposes an opt-in --env path that is passed into shared client setup, which parses key-value data from a .env file. This is legitimate but sensitive because .env files often contain secrets.
RISK-009 Alto
Environment file access
parser.add_argument("--env", default=None, help="Path to .env file (optional, opt-in).")
The script exposes an opt-in --env path that is passed into shared client setup, which parses key-value data from a .env file. This is legitimate but sensitive because .env files often contain secrets.
RISK-010 Alto
Environment file access
parser.add_argument("--env", default=None, help="Path to .env file (optional, opt-in).")
The script exposes an opt-in --env path that is passed into shared client setup, which parses key-value data from a .env file. This is legitimate but sensitive because .env files often contain secrets.
RISK-011 Alto
Environment file access
parser.add_argument("--env", default=None, help="Path to .env file (optional, opt-in).")
The script exposes an opt-in --env path that is passed into shared client setup, which parses key-value data from a .env file. This is legitimate but sensitive because .env files often contain secrets.
RISK-012 Alto
Environment file access
parser.add_argument("--env", default=None, help="Path to .env file (optional, opt-in).")
The script exposes an opt-in --env path that is passed into shared client setup, which parses key-value data from a .env file. This is legitimate but sensitive because .env files often contain secrets.
RISK-013 Alto
Environment file access
parser.add_argument("--env", default=None, help="Path to .env file (optional, opt-in).")
The script exposes an opt-in --env path that is passed into shared client setup, which parses key-value data from a .env file. This is legitimate but sensitive because .env files often contain secrets.
RISK-014 Alto
Plain HTTP Credential Flow in Examples
The quick start shows a password-grant request over HTTP, and the example config uses the same HTTP endpoint. Credentials could be intercepted or sent to the wrong host.
The cited lines combine password-based authentication with plain HTTP example endpoints. This is a clear transport and misconfiguration risk even though the endpoint appears private.
RISK-015 Alto
Command-Line Credentials and Token Output
The token script accepts a password on the command line and prints the token response to stdout. Shell history, process listings, or logs can expose credentials and bearer tokens.
The script directly defines --password and prints the login response. The documentation also demonstrates password arguments in shell commands.
RISK-016 Medio
scripts/update_user_management_doc.py:8-10scripts/doc_grid_lib.py:471-476scripts/collab_delete_blocks.mjs:90-91
Destructive In-Place AppFlowy Updates
The automation can delete blocks, remove row orders, and rebuild Grid sections while authenticated. Running it against the wrong view can cause AppFlowy data loss.
The cited files explicitly describe deleting old Grid blocks and implement row/block deletion updates. The behavior is intentional but risky for production workspaces.
Medidas correctivas
Esta auditoría registra correcciones sugeridas. Aplicarlas es responsabilidad de la persona encargada del mantenimiento.
- FIX-001AltoPlain HTTP and private IP examplesReplace concrete HTTP addresses with placeholders, document HTTPS requirements, and require users to supply their own endpoint.
- FIX-002AltoCommand-line credential and token exposurePrefer secure prompts or secret stores, redact token output, and remove password examples that persist in shell history.
- FIX-003AltoOpt-in .env file accessDocument the exact keys read, reject unexpected keys, and warn before reading files outside the project or skill directory.
- FIX-004MedioDestructive AppFlowy updatesAdd dry-run output, backups, and confirmation for cleanup, rebuild, block deletion, and row deletion operations.
Evidencia experta
Identidad inmutable del sujeto, metadatos del escáner, coincidencias descartadas y evidencia a nivel de código fuente.
Sujeto del artefacto
- Commit de Marketplace
- No disponible
- Hash del contenido
- No disponible
- Hash del árbol
- No disponible
- Ruta del Skill
- No disponible
- Hash de la carga de auditoría
- No disponible
Metadatos del análisis
Modelo de auditoría: codex
Estado del análisis: Completo
El alcance se limita a los archivos, líneas, métodos y pruebas registrados. No se afirma ninguna ejecución en tiempo de ejecución ni en entorno aislado.
Verificar y exportar
El manifiesto y el archivo de bloqueo vinculan los artefactos de instalación a hashes criptográficos. Esta afirmación de integridad es independiente de la evaluación de seguridad.
Atestación de auditoría: not_attestable